India in Central Asia: Strategic autonomy in Eurasia’s changing geopolitics?

India’s engagement with Central Asia is increasingly acquiring a security dimension that goes beyond traditional military cooperation. Geography, the instability emanating from Afghanistan, terrorism, drug trafficking, cybercrime and the changing balance of power in Eurasia have created a broad convergence of interests between India and the Central Asian republics. At the same time, the region is navigating an increasingly complex geopolitical environment shaped by Russia, China, the United States and the European Union. For India, this makes Central Asia not merely an extended neighbourhood, but an important component of its wider Eurasian strategic outlook.

India’s relations with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have developed into strategic partnerships, while engagement with Turkmenistan has also remained significant. The first India–Central Asia Summit in January 2022 provided an institutional framework for elevating this relationship. Security cooperation has subsequently expanded through National Security Adviser-level consultations, military exercises, defence training and cooperation on Afghanistan. The Indian Council of World Affairs has identified terrorism, extremism, drug trafficking, transnational crime and cyber threats as common security challenges confronting India and Central Asia.

Afghanistan remains the most immediate geographical link between the security concerns of South Asia and Central Asia. Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan share borders with Afghanistan, while India remains directly affected by developments in the country despite not sharing a border with it. The Taliban’s return to power in 2021 heightened concerns over terrorism, radicalisation, organised crime and narcotics trafficking across the wider region.

The security implications are not confined to conventional terrorism. Afghanistan’s position within established trafficking networks creates a broader transnational challenge. The northern routes connect Afghanistan with Central Asia and Russia, while southern routes extend towards South Asia through Pakistan and Iran. Drug trafficking can also intersect with money laundering, organised crime and terrorist financing, making the Afghan problem a multidimensional security challenge rather than simply an issue of counter-terrorism.

India and Central Asian countries have consequently sought greater coordination on Afghanistan. The 2021 Regional Security Dialogue on Afghanistan in New Delhi brought together security officials from the region, while the India–Central Asia Joint Working Group on Afghanistan has provided a further institutional channel. India and Central Asian countries have repeatedly emphasised the need to prevent Afghan territory from becoming a sanctuary for terrorist organisations.

This convergence gives India an opportunity to deepen its role in Central Asian security discussions without attempting to replicate the role of any other major power. Intelligence exchanges, counter-terrorism training, border-security cooperation and capacity building can provide practical avenues for engagement.

India’s security engagement with Central Asia has gradually moved beyond political declarations towards practical defence cooperation. Bilateral agreements with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have supported military education, training, technical cooperation and institutional capacity building.

Military exercises have been particularly useful because they let the participating countries’ armed forces exchange operational experience. The India–Kazakhstan Kazind, India–Kyrgyzstan Khanjar and India–Uzbekistan Dustlik exercises have focused on counter-terrorism, special operations and operations in difficult terrain. The Dustlik exercise, for example, has incorporated activities involving intelligence and surveillance, joint command structures, heliborne operations and operations in mountainous and semi-urban environments.

The India–Kyrgyzstan relationship also demonstrates how defence cooperation can extend into specialised areas. Joint mountain expeditions and high-altitude biomedical research have created opportunities for cooperation in areas relevant to both countries' armed forces. Similarly, the India–Tajikistan Friendship Hospital demonstrated how India's capacity-building approach can combine defence cooperation with civilian-oriented humanitarian assistance.

This model is significant because India's comparative contribution to Central Asian security need not be defined exclusively through weapons or military deployments. Training, specialised expertise, military medicine, high-altitude research, counter-terrorism capabilities and institutional capacity building can offer more sustainable avenues of cooperation.

At the same time, India's engagement with Central Asia must be understood against the continuing importance of Russia. The Central Asian security architecture has historically been deeply connected with Moscow through the Soviet legacy, bilateral defence relationships and institutions such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are CSTO members, while Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have maintained security cooperation with Russia through bilateral mechanisms.

The Russia–Ukraine conflict, however, has altered perceptions of the regional balance. Central Asian states have had to manage the consequences of sanctions, disrupted transport networks, economic uncertainty and changing relations between Russia and Western countries. The resulting environment has encouraged them to diversify external partnerships while maintaining established relationships with Moscow.

The important point is that Central Asian states have not necessarily responded by replacing one strategic partner with another. Instead, they have increasingly pursued multivector diplomacy—maintaining relations with Russia while simultaneously expanding economic, diplomatic and security links with China, India, Turkey, the United States and the European Union. The source material highlights this as a mechanism through which Central Asian states seek to preserve strategic autonomy amid great-power competition.

China's expanding economic role and its growing involvement in regional security further complicate this picture. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), in which India, Russia, China and the Central Asian states participate, provides another platform through which counter-terrorism, extremism, drug trafficking and regional stability can be addressed. India's previous role in the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) also demonstrated the potential for institutional cooperation in intelligence and counter-terrorism.

Security and connectivity are increasingly interconnected. Central Asia's landlocked geography makes transportation routes strategically important, while geopolitical conflicts have exposed the vulnerability of established corridors. The India–Central Asia relationship has long been constrained by the absence of direct land connectivity. The Chabahar route and the International North–South Transport Corridor have therefore assumed importance as potential mechanisms for improving India's access to Central Asian markets.

Recent geopolitical tensions in West Asia have added a new layer of uncertainty. Discussions at a 2026 India–Central Asia conference in New Delhi highlighted concerns over the vulnerability of Chabahar and the broader implications for connectivity between India, Afghanistan and Central Asia. Participants also pointed to the need to diversify transportation routes and strengthen intra-regional resilience.

This suggests that connectivity should no longer be treated solely as an economic issue. Ports, transport corridors, customs systems and logistics infrastructure are increasingly part of the strategic resilience of states. For India, therefore, engagement with Central Asia should combine connectivity diplomacy with security cooperation and economic partnerships.

The security agenda is also expanding into cyberspace. Central Asian countries face challenges involving online radicalisation, financial fraud, ransomware, cryptocurrency-related crime and the misuse of digital platforms. India's experience in digital governance and cybersecurity creates scope for a new dimension of bilateral cooperation. Joint training programmes, cyber-forensics capacity building, information sharing and cooperation against terrorist use of digital platforms could become important components of India's security engagement with the region. The first India–Central Asia Summit explicitly identified the misuse of cyberspace for disinformation and incitement as a shared concern.

The evolving security environment suggests that India–Central Asia cooperation is likely to become broader, more institutionalised and increasingly multidimensional. Traditional defence cooperation will remain important, but future engagement could encompass cybersecurity, border management, counter-narcotics, intelligence cooperation, disaster response, critical infrastructure protection and high-altitude technologies.

At the same time, Central Asian countries' emphasis on sovereignty and strategic autonomy needs to remain central to India's approach. Their multivector policies demonstrate a preference for maintaining multiple partnerships rather than becoming embedded in exclusive geopolitical blocs. India can therefore position itself as a complementary partner—contributing capacity, technology, training and connectivity while respecting the independent foreign-policy choices of Central Asian states.

The broader strategic opportunity lies in connecting India's security, economic and connectivity objectives. Central Asia's geographical position, resources and growing regional agency make it increasingly relevant to India's Eurasian strategy. The region's own efforts to strengthen intra-Central Asian cooperation, including through the Consultative Meetings of Heads of State, could also create additional space for India's engagement.

Ultimately, the emerging India–Central Asia partnership is being shaped by a common need for stability in an increasingly uncertain neighbourhood. Afghanistan, terrorism, narcotics, cyber threats and disrupted connectivity provide immediate areas of convergence, while the wider competition among major powers provides the geopolitical context. India's most sustainable role is likely to lie in strengthening institutional cooperation and regional capacity rather than framing the relationship through bloc politics. Such an approach would allow New Delhi and the Central Asian republics to preserve strategic autonomy while building practical mechanisms for security, connectivity and long-term regional resilience.