Introduction
The partial military mobilization process in Russia will harm Kyrgyz people, both, those who gained Russian citizenship as well as, Kyrgyz citizens working there, as labor migrants. It will also have overall economic challenges and risks for migrants from Kyrgyzstan such as, losing jobs and/or late payment or reduction of salaries and some remittances sent to their families and relatives back in Kyrgyzstan. Although, the partial mobilization is relevant to Russian citizens only, there is also a risk that some labor migrants including Kyrgyz will be involved in War in Ukraine by force, manipulation, pressure, or deception by local Russian law enforcement authorities or private army recruiters such as, “Wagner”. Kyrgyz Embassy must work closely with Kyrgyz diasporas and labor migrants to explain details of partial mobilization and legal consequences to participate in War in Ukraine.
On the 21st of September, Russian President Putin declared partial military mobilization to support the Russian army’s invasion of Ukraine[1]. Just the day before that, the State Duma adopted the draft law on military mobilization in 3 readings without any prior discussion. How this partial mobilization could affect Kyrgyz people residing in Russia?
According to the data of the Centre for Employment Abroad under the Kyrgyz Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Migration[2], currently, 1 million and 118 thousand Kyrgyzstani people are living and working in Russia, including 600 000 who gained Russian citizenship since the independence from the Soviet Union.[3] It should be noted the reason many received Russian citizenship was one way to avoid bureaucratic difficulties and receive better-paid job perspectives. But in 2015 when Kyrgyzstan obtained membership in Eurasian Economic Union (EEU)[4], documentation requirements for Kyrgyz labor migrants were simplified (they were exempt from taking written tests on Russian language and history and patents fees, etc.,)[5] therefore, there was no need to gain Russian citizenship, accordingly, this process slowed down. Later, when the Russian government started to provide social benefits, child support payments, better salaries, and banks mortgage with fairer interests for its citizens, Kyrgyz migrants got motivated to gain Russian citizenship, and the number of applicants again increased. In addition to it, the high rate of unemployment back in Kyrgyzstan pushed Kyrgyz people to search for the solution to their economic problems. [6] Obtaining Russian citizenship was seen as one of the solutions for many labor migrants including those from Kyrgyzstan as well.
Many Kyrgyz in Russian has two passports Kyrgyz and Russian
There are three categories of Kyrgyzstani people in Russia now: the seasonal labor migrants and the other category, those who moved to Russia and gained Russian citizenship and the third, and those who have two passports, Kyrgyz and Russian. Although there is no agreement on dual citizenship between Kyrgyzstan and Russia, dual citizenship is not prohibited (with one exception with immediate neighboring countries), but not legalized as well, which is quite a tricky and unclear situation. [7] Consequently, many who gained Russian citizenship did not want to burn a bridge back to their motherland, which means they did not want to give up part of their identity by gaining Russian citizenship (in the form of a passport), thus gaining Russian citizenship was for solely economic purpose. But now these people who have two passports, Kyrgyz and Russian citizenship are facing a real risk due to partial mobilization. On the one hand, if they refuse to join the partial mobilization in Russia they will face punishment such as criminal liability (Article 328 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation). Evasion of conscription for military service is punishable by a fine of up to 200,000 rubles or in the amount of the income of the convicted person for a period of up to one and a half years[8]. On the other hand, in case, they join mobilization and war in Ukraine they face punishment in Kyrgyzstan under Article 256 of the Criminal Code of the Kyrgyz Republic, “The participation of citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic in hostilities on the territory of foreign states is punishable by imprisonment for up to ten years with confiscation of his/her property”.[9]
Kyrgyz labor migrants’ position is vulnerable and they are at risk in Russia
President Putin has stated in his speech that partial mobilization will only cover Russian citizens, who are in the reserve and at conscripted age. Defence Minister S. Shoigu mentioned an exact number of people to be mobilized, 300 000 men. [10] But Russian human rights lawyer Ekaterina Shulman shared her concerns over the definition and application of the term partial mobilization in reality, because, in the speech of Putin it was mentioned that only people in the reserve will be involved in partial mobilization but in the issued decree it was not mentioned, which provides authority for Russian military recruitment office to mobilize as many people as they need. [11] Another human rights defender Valentina Chupik who works closely with Central Asian migrants openly called all labor migrants and former migrants from Central Asia to run away from Russia as soon as possible, noting that in this so-called partial mobilization campaign Central Asian migrants can be easily targeted by Russian authorities[12] There were cases when Kyrgyz people have involved the Ukraine war on both Ukraine and Russian armies[13]. It should be noted that Kyrgyz labor migrants often face various forms of racial discrimination in Russia due to a lack of legal literacy, weak rule of law, and a higher level of systemic corruption within law enforcement bodies. Thus, Russian government authorities might abuse their power via manipulation, deception, psychological/physical threat, persuasion, reward and force some labor migrants to join military mobilization, as punitive measures for migrants’ minor violations, e.g. traffic accidents, etc. Thus, there is no guarantee that labor migrants will be left untouched by the partial mobilization, especially, in the light of recent videos on social media, where Russian private army officers were desperate by trying to recruit new fighters even among prisoners promising them freedom and care in return for their loyal service. At the same time, on social media (telegram channel), concerning Putin’s mobilization speech, there was the counter- video from Sayed Ismagilov[14], a Ukrainian Muslim religious clerk and soldier, who warned Muslims of entire Russia not to come to Ukraine to fight for Russian dictator instead, do their best to escape from the mobilization entirely, in case they cannot and were forced to come to the war in Ukraine then they need to simply surrender on the battlefield.
It is becoming quite challenging to depart from Russia
In the meantime, an anonymous Kyrgyz migrant based in Moscow informed that all of his friends and colleagues of conscripted age and are residing in various parts of the Russian Federation have received a written notice from the state military recruitment office to come for mobilization. Consequently, many Kyrgyz young people have been trying to escape this so-called partial mobilization campaign. But the cost of a ‘one-way’ ticket has rapidly gone up three-four times[15] and has been continuously going up every day by becoming significantly expensive for ordinary people to purchase. Furthermore, the tickets for certain dates even sold out. Yesterday, there was a rumor that Russian air companies (e.g. Aeroflot) require special written permission from a local military district office to allow him to purchase tickets. However, Aeroflot rejected such claims stating it, as fake information.
Conclusion
This situation with Putin’s military partial mobilization reminds for Kyrgyz people of the tragic events of 1916 when Tsarist Russia attempted to mobilize Central Asia including Kyrgyz for WWI in Europe[16]. Then Tsarist army failed to mobilize indigenous people since at the time Kyrgyz had refused to join the Tsarist’s mobilization for which, Kyrgyz people were brutally suppressed which provoked Urkun (Exodus) of Kyrgyz tribes to the west part of China. In the meantime, the Kyrgyz Embassy in Moscow made a special statement in which under Article 256, once again, warned Kyrgyz labor migrants about legal consequences in the case Kyrgyz migrants receive an order calling to participate in any military activities, the Embassy requests that Kyrgyz citizens immediately contact the diplomatic mission of the Kyrgyz Republic in the Russian Federation. Declaring partial mobilization indicates that the Kremlin needs more human resources to fight its war in Ukraine. Thus, Kyrgyz migrants must be extremely careful before signing any document. Recent amendments to the law to simplify granting Russian citizenship are also additional proof that the Russian military leadership, indeed, requires more people to fight its war. In the light of such necessity for more human resources for military purposes, there is a higher risk that labor migrants from Central Asia including Kyrgyz will be targeted by relevant Russian authorities to make them join the military mobilization to meet the increasing demand for soldiers to fight in the Ukraine war. Although the talk now is about partial mobilization only most likely Russian military will need more soldiers which will make military authorities go beyond 300 000 people.
Recommendations:
- Kyrgyz Embassy and consulates in the regions of Russia must monitor the situation with partial military mobilization and organize ‘hotlines’ for migrants to tackle possible challenges caused by it Kyrgyz migrants' position.
- Kyrgyz Embassy in Moscow and consulates in regions of Russia (in consultation with Kyrgyz MFA) must intensify the organizing of offline and online meetings with Kyrgyz diasporas and associations’ members and explain them and distribute written brochures of legal and other consequences of involvement in wars in foreign countries for Kyrgyz citizens based in Russia.
- Kyrgyz people who have two Kyrgyz and Russian passports should consult their cases with Russian human rights lawyers as well as, Kyrgyz lawyers.
- Kyrgyz migrants who have Russian citizenship should leave the territory of the Russian Federation for a while to avoid be mobilization process
- Kyrgyz labor migrants should be careful in signing any paper given by official authorities to prevent immediate mobilization.
- Kyrgyz migrants should learn about their rights and obligations in front of companies and official authorities.
References:
[1] Kremlin Official website, 'Putin’s speech on partial mobilization' (Kremlin website, 21 September, 2022) in Russian <www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69390> accessed 25.09.2022
[2] Radio Azattyk (RFE/RL Kyrgyz service) ‘The number of Kyrgyzstanis who left to work abroad exceeded 1.1 million’ in Russian (Azattyk.org, 22 Feb, 2022) < www.rus.azattyk.org/a/31694786.html > accessed 25.09.2022
[3] Akipress Information Agency ‘Partial mobilization in Russia. How many Kyrgyzstanis received Russian citizenship? (Akipress, 22 September, 2022) < www.kg.akipress.org/news:1806375 > accessed 25.09.2022
[4] Catherine Putz, ‘Kyrgyzstan (Finally) Joins the Eurasian Economic Union’ (the Diplomat, 22 May, 2022) < www.thediplomat.com/2015/05/kyrgyzstan-finally-joins-the-eurasian-economic-union > accessed 25.09.2022
[5] Stan Radar, Information Agency ‘Life of Kyrgyz labor migrants in Russia improved after the country joined the EEU’ (Stan Radar, 27 July, 2017) < www.stanradar.com/news/full/25827-zhizn-trudovyh-migrantov-kyrgyzstana-v-rossii-uluchshilas-posle-vstuplenija-strany-v-eaes-shestakov.html > accessed 25.09.2022
[6] Lazat Janybek Kyzy, ‘More and more Kyrgyz are trying to obtain Russian citizenship’ (Azattyk, 28 July, 2018) < www.rus.azattyk.org/a/kyrgyzstan_rossiya_migraziya-grazhdanstvo-mvd/29384835.html > accessed 25.09.2022
[7] Kubat Kasymbekov, ‘Dual citizenship is not prohibited, but not legalized’ (Azattyk, 31 January, 2013) < www.rus.azattyk.org/a/kyrgyzstan_russia_citizen/24888994.html> accessed 25.09.2022
[8] TACC Info Agency, ‘ The RF recognizes the mobilization period as an aggravating circumstance in the commission of crimes’ (TASS, 24 September, 2022) < www.tass.ru/politika/15855917?utm_source=google.com&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=google.com&utm_referrer=google.com > accessed 25.09.22
[9] Kyrgyz Embassy in Russia, ‘Embassy Information Statement, September 21, 2022 ’ (Kyrgyz MFA, 21 Sept, 2022)
<www.mfa.gov.kg/ru/dm/pkr-v-rf/news/20715> accessed 25.09.2022
[10] InterFax, , ‘Russian Defense Minister informed that 300,000 reservists will be drafted ’(InterFax, State Information Agency, 21 September, 2022) < www.interfax.ru/russia/863188 > accessed 25.09.20022
[11] Ekaterina Schulman, ‘On partial mobilization: not clear’ (personal Telegram channel, 21.09.2022) <www.t.me/eschulmann/4876> accessed 25.09.2022
[12] Borubek Kudayarov, ‘Valentina Chupik to migrants in Russia: Run away immediately!’ (Kaktus, 21.09.2022) < www.kaktus.media/doc/467570_valentina_chypik_migrantam_v_rossii:_begite_nemedlenno.html?fbclid=IwAR0TF22vdC2j_6I3cxdUCDpgZO4eS_9Jm_AuwV1ed-UkljCukZrG4liQuso > accessed 25.09.2022
[13] Azattyk Unalgy (Radio), ‘who is guiding Kyrgyz citizens to the War in Ukraine?’ (Azattyk Radio, 16 June, 2022) < www.youtube.com/watch?v=fywd_yPWEf0 > accessed 24.09.2022
[14] Sayed Ismagulov, Ukrainian Muslim soldier’ video speaking to Muslism of Russia (Telegram channel, 21 September, 2022) < www.web.telegram.org/k/#@nexta_live> accessed 25.09.2022
[15] Medina Kupsuldaeva, ‘With the mobilization, airfare from Russia to Kyrgyzstan has risen to 300 thousand soms.’ (Kloop, 21 September, 2022) < www.kloop.kg/blog/2022/09/23/na-fone-mobilizatsii-aviabilety-iz-rossii-v-kyrgyzstan-podorozhali-do-328-tysyach-somov/?fbclid=IwAR0u2IGIQ12mk6jbCwB3aMP2IBgeeGBZx58-rb7vG2CeHig1JkZUFEvzviw > accessed 25.09.2022
[16] Zamira Sydykova, ‘Commemorating the 1916 Massacres in Kyrgyzstan? Russia Sees a Western Plot’ (The CACI Analyst, 25 January, 2016), < www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13325-commemorating-the-1916-massacres-in-kyrgyzstan?-russia-sees-a-western-plot.html> accessed 25.09.2022