Research
The Diplomacy Cliff: Strategic Assessment of the US–Iran Endgame
May 20, 2026Eighty-two days into the most consequential Middle Eastern confrontation since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran stand at a diplomatic cliff edge. On May 20, President Donald Trump gave Tehran "two to three days" to accept a framework agreement; Iran responded by warning that any renewed war would bring "many more surprises" and could open "new fronts." Vice President JD Vance, the same day, said both sides had made "a lot of progress." The contradictory signals capture the moment precisely: a deal is closer than at any point since the February 28 launch of Operation Epic Fury, yet the structural distance between Washington's and Tehran's positions on the core nuclear and Hormuz questions remains nearly unbridgeable. This brief assesses (i) the probability and contours of a near-term agreement, (ii) the diplomatic mechanics now underway, (iii) the odds of resumed military confrontation, (iv) Iran's covert military reconstitution, (v) the positions of the key actors — Washington, Tehran, Jerusalem, the GCC, Beijing, Moscow, Islamabad — (vi) the evolving Strait of Hormuz crisis and its global market impact, and (vii) four scenarios for the next six months. The central judgment of this brief is that the most likely outcome is a partial, Hormuz-first arrangement that defers the nuclear question — a structurally unstable settlement that buys time but plants the seed of the next crisis.
Armenia's 2026 Elections: A Choice Between Peace and Renewed Confrontation
May 16, 2026Armenia's parliamentary elections on June 7, 2026 represent a strategic crossroads with consequences extending far beyond domestic politics. The vote will effectively function as a referendum on the most consequential question facing Armenian society: whether to consolidate the peace process with Azerbaijan and complete the country's strategic reorientation toward the West, or to return to a Russian-aligned posture promoted by an opposition that opposes the peace settlement. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's Civil Contract party campaigns on a clear platform: finalizing the peace treaty with Azerbaijan that was initialed in Washington in August 2025, amending the Armenian constitution to align it with the requirements of regional normalization, and completing Armenia's integration with the European Union, the United States, and broader Euro-Atlantic structures. This approach reflects Pashinyan's recognition that the post-2020 strategic environment requires Armenia to adapt to new regional realities and build sustainable relations with its neighbors. The opposition—principally former president Robert Kocharyan's Armenia Alliance and Russian-Armenian businessman Samvel Karapetyan's Strong Armenia—offers a competing vision rooted in restoring close ties with Moscow, blocking constitutional reform, and resisting the peace settlement. This orientation, supported by Russian political and informational networks, would effectively halt the peace process and return Armenia to a confrontational posture that has produced repeated military setbacks over the past three decades. The electoral choice is therefore unusually clear. A decisive Pashinyan victory clears the path for constitutional amendment, peace treaty ratification, and Armenia's full integration into a normalized South Caucasus regional architecture. An opposition victory or a narrow Civil Contract win without constitutional majority would derail the peace process, reopen the door to Russian influence, and elevate the risk of renewed military confrontation that Armenia is poorly positioned to sustain. This analysis examines the electoral landscape, the constitutional reform requirement central to peace treaty ratification, the role of Karabakh Armenians who relocated to Armenia after September 2023, Russian interference strategies targeting the elections, and the broader strategic implications of what has become the most consequential vote in Armenia's post-Soviet history. The Electoral Landscape: A Race Defined by the Undecided Polling data ahead of the June 7 vote presents a competitive but increasingly favorable picture for the incumbent government. The most methodologically rigorous surveys—conducted by the Armenian Election Study for EVN Report in early May 2026—show Civil Contract commanding 32.5 percent of committed voters, with Strong Armenia at 10.1 percent, the Armenia Alliance at 4.4 percent, and Prosperous Armenia at 3.4 percent. These headline figures obscure the election's true dynamics. Approximately 40 percent of Armenian voters remain uncommitted, either declining to answer (25.4 percent) or stating they do not know (14.1 percent). The behavior of this bloc will determine the outcome. Advanced statistical modeling that accounts for the policy preferences and directional leanings of undecided voters suggests Civil Contract could secure between 40.7 percent and 51.1 percent of the vote under an 85 percent turnout scenario. The trajectory of Pashinyan's approval is favorable for the incumbent. His job approval has risen methodically across three polling waves—from 36 percent in February to 47.2 percent in March to 49 percent in May. Public perception of the country's direction has improved correspondingly: 44 percent now believe Armenia is headed in the right direction, against 30.9 percent who disagree. Among undecided voters specifically, 41 percent approve of Pashinyan's performance, representing a 5.5 percentage point increase over the previous polling wave. Opposition-aligned polling presents a different narrative. Surveys published by outlets sympathetic to the opposition place Civil Contract at 26 to 27 percent, with combined opposition forces theoretically capable of forming a coalition majority. The divergence between these polling streams reflects both genuine methodological differences and the politicization of electoral forecasting in an environment where polls function as campaign instruments. What remains undisputed across polling sources is that Civil Contract leads all individual parties, that the opposition remains fragmented across competing personalities and platforms, and that the undecided bloc holds the decisive vote. Citizen forecasting—a methodology that aggregates respondents' predictions about who will win—consistently indicates that a clear majority of Armenian voters expect Civil Contract to secure a parliamentary majority and form a single-party government.
How the Iran War Sequel Reshaped UAE - Saudi Arabia Rivalry
May 9, 2026The 2026 Iran war — which began on 28 February with a coordinated US-Israeli operation against the Islamic Republic and continued through a fragile 8 April ceasefire still being violated as of May 2026 — has fundamentally transformed Saudi Arabia's strategic position. Riyadh emerged from the conflict facing four simultaneous shocks: direct Iranian missile and drone strikes on Saudi territory, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the United Arab Emirates' departure from OPEC, and a deepening rupture with Abu Dhabi over divergent visions for the post-war Gulf. This analysis examines how Saudi Arabia weathered the conflict, recalibrated its position toward Iran, navigated the structural threats to its Vision 2030 economic transformation, and now confronts a more complicated relationship with both the United States and the United Arab Emirates. The central argument is that Saudi Arabia, despite its restrained posture during the war, has emerged as the de facto stabiliser of a fractured Gulf order — but at significant cost. The kingdom's hedging strategy preserved its diplomatic flexibility but exposed the limits of its security partnerships. Riyadh's post-war reassessment now centres on three priorities: building genuine deterrence capability against Iran, reorienting energy infrastructure away from the Strait of Hormuz, and managing a Gulf rivalry with the UAE that has become structural rather than tactical.
No War, No Peace
April 25, 2026This article examines the U.S.–Iran ceasefire not as a path to peace, but as a fragile pause in a wider coercive confrontation. It argues that American air power, naval blockade, and economic pressure have damaged Iran but failed to force political compliance, while Iran’s disruption of the Strait of Hormuz has turned the conflict into a global energy, security, and alliance crisis. The article highlights the hidden costs of the war, including U.S. missile-stockpile depletion, the limits of military coercion, the rise of Chinese satellite intelligence, AI-driven propaganda, and growing Gulf doubts about reliance on American security guarantees. Its central argument is that both sides are trapped in a reciprocal coercion cycle, where each pressure tactic reinforces the other side’s resolve rather than producing compromise.
War in Iran and the Strait of Hormuz Crisis: Implications for Central Asia
April 16, 2026This article examines how the war in Iran and instability in the Strait of Hormuz could affect Central Asia, especially Kyrgyzstan, through indirect but serious economic and food-security pressures. It argues that even without direct involvement in the conflict, Kyrgyzstan is vulnerable to rising fertilizer and energy costs, supply chain disruptions, and lower agricultural productivity, showing how distant geopolitical crises can create immediate local consequences in an interconnected global economy.